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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
: Case No. 880651-CA 
v. 
GARY CLARK, : Category 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) as classified in 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(B), a second 
degree felony. 
Defendant was convicted on October 19, 1988 (R. 66). 
His notice of appeal was filed on November 17, 1988 (R. 76) 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) and Utah Court of 
Appeals Rule 4(a), jurisdiction is proper in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. What are the elements of the crime of which 
defendant was convicted? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence of defendant's guilt? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
admitting the drug paraphernalia evidence? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions will 
be excerpted as they become relevant in the argument, and 
provided in full in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary hearing was held on June 16, 1988, and on 
August 22, 1988, defendant was bound over to district court to 
stand trial on the charge of distribution of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony (R. 1). Arraignment was held 
on September 6, 1988, at which time defendant pled not guilty (R. 
13) . 
Defendant was convicted by the jury of distribution of 
a controlled substance on October 19, 1988 (R. 66). Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-402, defendant's conviction was 
reduced to a third degree felony. His sentence of zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison was suspended, and defendant was 
placed on probation (R. 112-115 (unbound)). 
On November 15, 1988, defendant moved for a new trial, 
alleging as grounds that one of the jurors when polled did not 
claim the verdict of "guilty" as his, and that defendant was 
thereby denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict (R. 101). 
Defendant was sentenced on December 1, 1989 (R. Ill (unbound)). 
Defendant's judgment of conviction for distribution of a 
controlled substance was entered on January 13, 1989, and filed 
with the clerk on January 19, 1989 (R. 112-115 (unbound)). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 29, 1987, Officer Lon Brian of the Davis 
Metro Narcotic Strike Force, spoke with an inmate in the jail who 
told him that a Mr. Adam Hicks was trafficking in drugs (T. 44-
47). Officer Brian, with the assistance of this confidential 
informant, arranged to meet Mr. Hicks at his residence in Layton 
(T. 47). Officer Brian wore a listening device, and went to the 
Hicks residence with the confidential informant (T. 48, 50). 
Officer Brian met Adam Hicks and defendant, and then Adam Hicks 
and the confidential informant went into the back of the house, 
leaving Officer Brian with defendant (T. 50-51). 
Defendant indicated to Officer Brian that defendant and 
Adam Hicks were partners, that the cocaine to be transacted was 
of very good quality, and that defendant had the equipment to 
"rock the cocaine out" (T. 53-54). Defendant and Adam Hicks 
both attempted repeatedly to telephone a person named Ron 
Johnson, and failing to do so, decided to go to Ogden to find him 
at a bar or at home (T. 54-55). 
Officer Brian drove with Adam Hicks and the 
confidential informant to the Johnson residence, and defendant 
went in a separate car to look for Ron Johnson in a bar (T. 55). 
When the Brian car arrived at the Johnson residence, they went in 
and found Pat and her daughter, Fortune Johnson (T. 56). Pat 
Johnson expressed some dismay that Adam Hicks would come to her 
home and engage in drug transactions without giving her prior 
"Rocking the cocaine out" is a process by which powdered (and 
presumably diluted cocaine) is recondensed into blocks or other 
forms, in order to make it appear more pure (T. 51-53). 
warning (T. 56). 
Negotiations then began: Officer Brian agreed to buy 
for $15,500 one pound of cocaine from the Johnsons at a motel 
fifteen to twenty hours later (T. 57-58). Defendant came into 
the Johnson home during the end of the negotiations, and the 
entire agreement was reiterated after he arrived (T. 57, 73). 
When the meeting adjourned, Officer Brian observed a 
"slight contact" that was "similar to a handshake" between 
defendant and Pat Johnson (T. 58). When Officer Brian got 
outside with the confidential informant, Adam Hicks, and 
defendant, defendant asked Adam Hicks if Adam had observed 
defendant giving Pat Johnson two and a half grams of "re-rocked" 
cocaine (T. 58-59 ) . 
Officer Brian reentered the car with Adam Hicks and the 
confidential informant, and defendant took a separate car (T. 
59). As they were returning to Layton, defendant pulled up to 
the Officer Brian car and informed the gentlemen therein that the 
Brian car was being tailed (T. 59). 
The car that was tailing the Brian car was driven by 
Narcotics Enforcement Officer Ron Stalworth (T. 34), whom was 
notified by Alan Larsen, the officer monitoring the bug worn by 
Officer Brian, that their surveillance should cease because it 
had been detected (T. 35-36, 40-44). 
The original plans made at the Johnson residence were 
never carried out - the cocaine transaction involving Officer 
Brian involved one and a half ounces of cocaine, which he 
purchased at a later date for $2,300 from the Johnson's near 
their residence when defendant was not present (T. 79, 82, 88, 
90). After the night of October 29, the only evidence of 
defendant's participation in the cocaine transaction was the 
telephone calls he answered from the undercover officers who were 
attempting to locate Adam Hicks (T. 61). 
The gist of defendant's case was that he was trying to 
help an old and troubled friend, Adam Hicks, out of his drug 
problems by assisting Adam in undercover police narcotics 
investigations, and that defendant knew nothing of drugs and had 
no intention of dealing in them (T. 122-144). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was properly convicted of distributing or 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance. The crime 
charged does not bear as a necessary element successful 
distribution, and there was ample evidence of both arrangement 
and distribution of a controlled substance by defendant. 
Defendant waived his objection to the admission of the 
paraphernalia based on an allegedly unreasonable search, because 
he waited to raise the issue until the close of the evidence, 
when the witnesses had already testified to the location and 
purposes of the paraphernalia. 
Were defendant in a position to raise this search and 
seizure argument, it would fail. There was no unreasonable 
search because there was no search at all - defendant voluntarily 
gave all of the paraphernalia to Officer Brian. If there were a 
search, defendant gave his legal consent to it, and the evidence 
obtained therefrom was not prejudicial to defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) FOR ARRANGING 
TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
A. The Elements Of Arranging To Distribute A Controlled 
Substance. 
The statute under which defendant was convicted, Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8, states, in part: 
(a) Except as authorized by this 
chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance. 
Defendant claimed at trial and claims on appeal that he did not 
arrange for distribution because the cocaine transaction in which 
he participated (one pound of cocaine to be sold for $15,500 at 
an unnamed motel) fell through (T. 96; App. Br. 7-10). 
Several Utah cases demonstrate that the trial court was 
right when he rejected defendant's argument, stating, "THE COURT 
WOULD FIND that there is no requirement that a sale actually 
takes place under the law, under this section of the code" (T. 
99-100). In State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), the 
court was interpreting a statute which preceded the current one, 
explaining: 
Inasmuch as an actual sale took place in 
this case, it is unnecessary to address the 
point, but it is noteworthy that the offense 
of arranging the distribution for value of a 
controlled substance does not require the 
actual distribution. All that is needed is 
the arrangement for such distribution, 
coupled with knowledge or intent. Evidence 
of an actual sale may be helpful, or even 
necessary, in proving knowledge or intent, 
but sale itself is not an element of the 
offense. 
Id. at 924, n. 5. 
Interpretations of the current statute follow the 
reasoning and language of the Harrison case. Cf., State v. 
Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1987)("Although defendant's 
construction of the statute may be a plausible one, we are not 
inclined to reconsider our settled and consistent construction of 
the statute in Harrison, Hicken, and Ontiveros. This is 
especially true since the legislature recently revised and 
clarified Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8, and the revised statute 
unmistakably prohibits arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance."). 
B. The Evidence Supporting Defendant's Conviction 
Of Arranging The Distribution Of A Controlled 
Substance. 
When the trial court rejected defendant's motion for 
dismissal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, the court 
stated: 
The COURT DOES FIND that from the 
evidence taken in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution which the court must, the 
COURT WILL FIND that the evidence has been 
that Mr. Clark was at the residence at the 
time the initial contact was made by Officer 
Brian. That Mr. Clark discussed the nature 
of the cocaine, the fact that it could be 
rocked. That it was of a high quality. He 
participated in attempting to reach Mr. 
Johnson by telephone. The evidence indicates 
that at the time they left in their vehicles 
that he left in one vehicle to go to a bar to 
try to locate Mr. Johnson. Officer Brian and 
Mr. Hicks went in a different vehicle to the 
home of Pat Johnson. 
The record would indicate that he was 
present at the time of the negotiations and 
that the initial deal was made relative to 
the purchase of a pound of cocaine, and 
participated in that negotiation. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND that there is no 
requirement that a sale actually takes place 
under the law, under this section of the 
code, and that if the jury in fact believe 
everything that they have heard in that 
regard, they could have sufficient evidence 
to convict the defendant in this matter. 
Therefore the court will deny the motion at 
this time. 
(T. 99-100). 
In reviewing defendant's claim of insufficient 
evidence, 
This Court must view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict and will 
interfere only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable 
person could not possibly have reached a 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989)(citations 
omitted). 
While the statute under which defendant was convicted 
defines many acts which, coupled with intent, constitute the 
2 
crime, defendant's prosecution might be construed as excluding 
the possibility of conviction for actual distribution. While the 
verdict signed by the jury foreman found defendant guilty of 
"distribution of a controlled substance" (R. 66), while 
Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8, states, in part: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
• • • • 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
defendant's information included all of the acts listed in the 
statute as being applicable in this case, and while defendant's 
4 . information was quoted in the jury instructions, instruction 
number 15 might be read as excluding distribution from the list 
of acts for which defendant could be convicted.5 The apparent 
Defendant's information states, in part, as follows: 
The undersigned affiant, Lon Brian, under oath 
states on information and belief that the defendant, on 
or about the 29th day of October, 1987, at County of 
Davis, State of Utah, committed the crime of 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) a felony of thee second degree, as follows: 
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did 
distribute a controlled substance, cocaine, or 
counterfeit substance, or did agree, consent, offer, or 
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, cocaine. 
(R. 9). 
4 
Jury Instruction 12 states, in part, 
The defendant, Gary T. Clark, is charged in the 
Information with the crime of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance as follows: 
That on or about the 29th of October, 1987 in 
Davis County, State of Utah, the defendant did 
distribute a controlled substance, cocaine, or 
counterfeit substance, or did agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, cocaine. 
(R. 45). 
Instruction 15 states, in part: 
Before you can convict the defendant, Gary Clark, 
as charged in the Information, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of the crime: 
1. That the defendant Gary Clark, knowingly and 
intentionally 
2. Agreed, consented, offered or arranged to 
distribute or dispense a controlled substance: to wit 
cocaine 
3. That any of the above conduct or results 
thereof occurred in Davis County, Utah on or about the 
29th day of October, 1987. 
discrepancy is explained by Instruction 16, which explains that 
actual distribution is not necessary for a conviction. 
If distribution is found by this Court to be one of the 
acts for which the jurors might have convicted defendant, there 
is sufficient evidence to support a finding of distribution. As 
noted in the statement of facts, when the meeting at the Johnson 
residence adjourned, Officer Brian observed defendant making with 
Mrs. Johnson a "slight contact" that was "similar to a handshake" 
(T. 58), which was followed by defendant's asking Adam Hicks if 
Hicks had seen defendant give Mrs. Johnson two and a half grams 
of cocaine (T. 58-59). 
If this Court construes defendant's prosecution as 
limited to defendant's agreeing, consenting, offering, or 
arranging to distribute cocaine, there is ample evidence to 
support the jury's verdict. 
As noted in the statement of facts, when Officer Lon 
Brian was left with defendant at the Hicks residence, defendant 
stated that he and Hicks were partners, that the quality of the 
cocaine involved was very good, and that defendant had all of the 
equipment to "re-rock" the cocaine (T. 53-54). Defendant made at 
least one phone call to Ron Johnson, the source of the cocaine, 
5
 Cont. (R. 48). 
Instruction 16 states: 
You are instructed that the offense of arranging 
the distribution of a controlled substance does not 
require the actual distribution of the substance. 
Evidence of an actual sale may be helpful in proving 
knowledge or intent but the sale itself is not an 
element of the offense. 
(R. 49). 
and drove to a bar in Ogden to find him (T. 54-55). Defendant 
came into the Johnson home during the end of the negotiations, 
and the entire agreement was reiterated after he arrived (T. 57, 
73). After apparently passing some cocaine to Pat Johnson (T. 
58-59), defendant followed the Hicks car and informed the 
occupants thereof when they were being tailed (T. 59). 
The fact that this evidence is sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction is demonstrated by reference to other Utah 
cases. See e.g., State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1320-1321 (Utah 
1986)(arranging for distribution was proven by, inter alia, 
defendant's discussion of the cocaine's quality, defendant's 
speaking as though she and a known drug dealer were acting 
together). 
POINT II 
THE DRUG PARAPHERNALIA WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
During the trial, the following items were admitted 
into evidence: acetone, powder scales, sulfuric acid, filter 
cloth, test tubes, acetol powder, beakers and bottles, a heat 
lamp, and a book on re-rocking cocaine (T. 159-166). Testimony 
was introduced that this equipment is all used in re-rocking 
cocaine (T. 191-192; 167 and Exhibit 1). Defendant explained 
that he had a book on rocking cocaine and all of the equipment 
necessary to rock cocaine because the book and some of the 
equipment belonged to Adam, because Adam wanted to better prepare 
defendant for their undercover work, and because Adam had asked 
defendant to gather other materials so that Adam could perform 
7 
his intended scientific projects (T. 158-168). 
The court instructed the jury that the evidence was 
o 
relevant only to defendant's credibility : 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, the Court has received the plaintiff's 
proposed exhibits one through nine. Provided 
however, the Court instructs you that those 
exhibits are received only for the purpose of 
the credibility of the defendant. They do 
not go in any way to provide any new 
evidence of any crime or other matter, but 
they are received only as they may bear on 
the credibility of the defendant in this 
case. 
(T. 205). 
On appeal, defendant objects to the admission of this 
evidence, claiming that the evidence was obtained illegally, when 
defendant was coerced into consenting to the search of his house 
by Officer Brian's threat to pursue additional charges against 
defendant. 
While some of defendant's testimony and some of 
defendant's arguments on appeal might lead this Court to believe 
that Officer Brian granted defendant complete immunity from all 
charges when he went to retrieve the paraphernalia, review of the 
entire record demonstrates to the contrary. Although defendant 
For example, defendant testified, "Adam had an idea. He found 
out how to make a synthetic gun powder and you used cotton and 
ping-pong-balls and you mix it together and it creates this 
synthetic gun powder which I think is called gun cotton." (T. 
159). 
p 
Defendant claimed that he was inexperienced in illegal drugs 
(T. 143-144), that he did not tell Officer Brian that he could 
re-rock cocaine (T. 156), and that he didn't know much about re-
rocking cocaine (T. 160, 166). The facts that defendant had 
these materials in his home, and knew what to hand Officer Brian 
when Officer Brian asked for the paraphernalia had some bearing 
on defendant's credibility. 
testified at trial that "[his] understanding was that if [he] 
fully cooperated with [Officer Brian during the search] that he 
wasn't going to press charges/' (T. 157), his true motivation in 
cooperating with Officer Brian (inevitability), is demonstrated 
by looking at the testimony which follows immediately his claim 
that he thought he was completely immune: 
A. My understanding was that if I fully 
cooperated with him that he wasn't going to 
press charges. 
Q. Ok. And as far as that, you gave him 
consent to come into your home and conduct a 
search; is that correct? 
A. Well when he told me that it was 
either I would be arrested right there on the 
spot and him come back with a search warrant 
and go through with dogs and tear my house 
apart, yes I gave him my consent rather than 
being arrested at the time. 
(T. 157-158). According to Officer Brian, the discussion between 
defendant and Officer Brian was as follows: 
A. After getting an answer at the door 
I informed him that Mr. Hicks had been 
arrested. There was possible implications 
with Mr. Clark's involvement in the 
distribution of cocaine or the arranging for 
the sale of cocaine. I informed him that 
Adam Hicks had told me of certain 
paraphernalia that was at the house. 
I was invited into the living room 
area.. Ah, I believe I requested a consent 
search to pick up the paraphernalia, ah, 
informing Mr. Clark at this time, if we could 
clean the paraphernalia out of the home that 
there wouldn't be a chance of him getting 
future charges on possession or things like 
that. 
(T. 187-188). While parts of the cross-examination of Officer 
Brian by defense counsel might be construed as implying a promise 
of complete immunity, review of the entire cross-examination 
indicates knowledge that Officer Brian was helping defendant 
avoid charges relating to possession of the paraphernalia: 
Q. Officer Brian, did I understand you 
correctly when you went to the residence, 
your previous testimony was, when you went to 
the residence you said, if you give me the 
stuff I won't file any possession or 
paraphernalia charges against you. 
A. I don't believe I testified to that. 
Q. What specifically did you tell him 
then? 
A. I don't recall word for word what I 
had told him. I, in picking up paraphernalia 
after an arrest on an individual, usually I 
like to tell them that it would be a good 
idea to get all of the paraphernalia out of 
the house so that it doesn't come back on 
them at a later date. 
Q. So it doesn't come back on them at a 
later date? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did you explain that to him, did you 
say anything? 
A. Yes, I explained that to him. 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I explained to him as I stated 
before, in contacting him at the door, I 
indicated to him that Adam had told me that 
there was paraphernalia and certain items in 
the house. Ah, I informed him that I would 
like to pick those items up so that they 
don't come back and charge him with 
possession and have something come back on 
him at a later date. 
Q. So in other words you were saying, 
if he gave them to you now you wouldn't be 
charging him now? 
A. I believe that was right. 
Q. So if he were to give you those 
things at that point, you wouldn't charge any 
charges against him if he gives you the 
paraphernalia or things like that? 
A. I believe that would be assumable. 
(T. 192-194). At the close of the evidence, Mr. Vanderlinden 
objected again to the admission of the evidence. This 
discussion, as well as the absence of any efforts to make the 
prosecution live up to any promise of complete immunity, 
demonstrates defendant's understanding that it was only 
additional charges that defendant thought he was avoiding: 
First of all I don't think there was a 
proper consent given, I think when a police 
officer comes into a home and says, if you 
give us the stuff we wouldn't file charges 
against you, in essence that is what he did. 
Look, there is a possession of paraphernalia 
charge, possession charges against you. If 
you give us the stuff we won't make the 
charges and also I don't think there is a 
charge. I don't think that is a free 
voluntary consent. That it's a forceful 
consent. 
He is forcing him to give his consent to 
take these items and a consent search has to 
be voluntary, has to be agreed to be given 
and have no conversion whatsoever. And the 
fact that Officer Brian said, hey, if you 
don't give us this stuff we are going to file 
charges against you, or we can file charges 
against you. That's clearly conversion 
[coercion], that's clearly forcing him to 
make a decision and it's not freely and 
voluntarily given and I think on that basis I 
don't think it should be admitted. 
(T. 199-200). 
A. Defendant Waived His Opportunity To Object To The 
Admission Of The Paraphernalia On The Grounds Of 
Illegal Search By Officer Brian. 
Defense counsel was given his first record notice of 
the basis of the argument he raises on appeal (that defendant was 
coerced into consenting to the search of his house for drug 
paraphernalia by Officer Brian's threat to pursue additional 
charges against defendant) during the State's case-in-chief, when 
Officer Brian testified concerning his final contact with 
defendant: 
A- Ah, I had informed him that Adam had 
been arrested. Ah, indicated to him that I 
would be contacting the County Attorney's 
Office and that he would probably be 
implicated in the arrangement of the cocaine 
and also that I wanted to pick up the 
paraphernalia and lab equipment that was 
there at the house. 
(T. 61). The paraphernalia was next mentioned during defendant's 
case, during the cross-examination of defendant: 
Q. So when you left, you had no other 
contact with Lon Brian; is that correct? 
After the 29th until the 6th. 
A. No I did not. 
Q. Until the 6th of November? 
A. Yes, about 3 a.m. 
Q. And that's when he came to your 
home; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And informed you that Adam Hicks had 
been arrested? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. And informed you that he would 
probably be seeking a complaint about you 
with the Davis County Attorney's Office. 
A. My understanding was that if I fully 
cooperated with him that he wasn't going to 
press charges. 
Q. Ok. And as far as that, you gave him 
consent to come into your home and conduct a 
search; is that correct? 
A. Well when he told me that it was 
either I would be arrested right there on the 
spot and him come back with a search warrant 
and go through with dogs and tear my house 
apart, yes I gave him my consent rather than 
being arrested at the time. 
Q. And that's what happened? 
A. Yes 
Q. He threatened you, is that what your 
saying? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Anyway Officer Brian did go through 
your home; is that correct? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. And he did find certain items in you 
home, did he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He found certain equipment used to 
"rock cocaine"? 
A. I guess he found the chemical stuff 
that was bagged up to take back to school the 
next day. 
Q. It was all bagged up? 
A. Yes it was. 
Q. And if Mr. Brian got on the stand 
and testified that he found it all through 
your home; he would be lying? 
A. Yes he would because it wasn't all 
over in my house, it was in the kitchen. 
(T. 157-159). 
Mr. Vanderlinden first objected to the discussion of 
the specific equipment needed to "rock cocaine" after the 
prosecution had begun to elicit from defendant the purposes for 
the paraphernalia in defendant's home. The objection and ruling 
were as follows: 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: I would have to 
object to this line of questioning. What 
Adam did, I think it's legally prejudicial to 
my client. I don't know if, this man is 
charged with arranging a sale and this has 
nothing to do with whatever Adam did and I 
think it would be immaterial. 
THE COURT: Well it goes to his 
credibility. He said he has no knowledge of 
drugs or knows anything about them. I will 
overrule the objection. 
(T. 161). Defense counsel again objected to the materiality of 
the paraphernalia evidence once again (T. 179) prior to its 
admission (T. 202-205). 
The first time that defendant claimed that the evidence 
should have been excluded on the basis of an illegal search came 
at the close of all of the evidence, after the jury had seen and 
heard about the purposes for and location of the paraphernalia: 
First of all I don't think there was a 
proper consent given, I think when a police 
officer comes into a home and says, if you 
give us the stuff we wouldn't file charges 
against you, in essence that is what he did. 
Look, there is a possession of paraphernalia 
charge, possession charges against you. If 
you give us the stuff we won't make the 
charges and also I don't think there is a 
charge. I don't think that is a free 
voluntary consent. That it's a forceful 
consent. 
He is forcing him to give his consent to 
take these items and a consent search has to 
be voluntary, has to be agreed to be given 
and have no conversion whatsoever. And the 
fact that Officer Brian said, hey, if you 
don't give us this stuff we are going to file 
charges against you, or we can file charges 
against you. That's clearly conversion 
[coercion], that's clearly forcing him to 
make a decision and it's not freely and 
voluntarily given and I think on that basis I 
don't think it should be admitted. 
My second objection to it be admitted 
for the purposes for the record, and I don't 
think the presence of these items legally 
outweighs the purpose for which it was done. 
I think the Court has to do a balancing act. 
Mr. Major is offering them in as to the 
prejudicial credibility of my client and I 
think that, ah, I would ask The Court to 
consider this because of the legally 
prejudicial nature. The fact that they are 
from Adam Hicks, I would ask The Court to 
reconsider the admissability of these things 
into evidence. 
(T. 199-200). The court denied defendant relief, explaining that 
defendant consented to Officer Brian's taking the paraphernalia, 
and noting that defendant's objection came too late (T. 201-205). 
Mr. Vanderlinden argued that he waited to state the 
objection until after the foundation for the evidence had been 
laid because it was only then that he knew the basis for the 
objection: 
Your Honor these things were offered 
into evidence after he showed them to the 
jury. I had no knowledge, absolutely no 
knowledge whatsoever about the foundation. I 
had no knowledge about what happened at that 
time. I was in an awkward position, I 
couldn't object because I didn't know what 
was going to happen. If the Court allow 
this, every single case that come in, he can 
lay the evidence in front of the jury first, 
then afterwards lay the foundation and I 
can't object. 
(T. 204). The Court, however, accepted the paraphernalia into 
evidence (T. 202-205). 
As noted above, defendant's first record notice of the 
circumstances surrounding the seizure of the paraphernalia 
occurred during the prosecution's case in chief, at page 61 of 
the transcript. There was no need for defendant to wait until 
after all of the paraphernalia evidence had been presented to the 
jury to state his objection, and by waiting to present the 
argument, defendant waived it. C_f. State v. Schreuder, 726 P. 2d 
1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)(the preservation of an evidentiary 
objection for appeal requires at trial a timely objection, which 
states the grounds therefore clearly and concisely). 
While defendant does allude on appeal to the Utah 
Constitution search and seizure provision, no independent 
analysis is given thereto, and defendant did not ask the trial 
court to rule on the basis of the Utah Constitution. Under these 
circumstances, this Court need not determine the similarity of 
interpretation to be given to the Utah and United States 
constitutional provisions. State v. Johnson, 104 Utah Adv. R. 
34, 35 (Utah App. 1989) . 
B. There Was No Unconstitutional Search 
According to Officer Brian, he did not search 
defendant's home to obtain the paraphernalia, but accepted the 
paraphernalia from defendant: 
A. After getting an answer at the door 
I informed him that Mr. Hicks had been 
arrested. There was possible implications 
with Mr. Clark's involvement in the 
distribution of cocaine or the arranging for 
the sale of cocaine. I informed him that 
Adam Hicks had told me of certain 
paraphernalia that was at the house. 
I was invited into the living room area. 
Ah, I believe I requested a consent search to 
pick up the paraphernalia, ah, informing Mr. 
Clark at this time, if we could clean the 
paraphernalia out of the home that there 
wouldn't be a chance of him getting future 
charges on possession or things like that. 
Q. Did you threaten Mr. Clark in any 
way? 
A. Nof I did not. 
Q. Thank you. Did you conduct a search 
of the home? 
A. No sir, I didn't conduct a search, 
the items were given to me by Mr. Clark. He 
led me to where they were. 
(T. 187-188). See also Appellant's Brief at 4 ("Gary Clark then 
handed Lon Brian various glass tubes, vials and chemicals 
subsequent testimony was received that these items could be used 
in connection with controlled substances. (T. 194, 195, 193)."). 
In these circumstances, no constitutional right of 
defendant was violated because there was no search. See State v. 
Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1980)("To 'search' is to 
look into or over carefully and thoroughly in an effort to find 
or discover."). See also, McGee v. State, 614 P.2d 800, 805 
(Alaska 1980)("We do not believe that the trooper's conduct in 
this case constituted a search within the meaning of Brown. The 
facts show that appellant himself retrieved the weapon and 
presented it to Trooper Cole. There is no evidence of duress or 
coercion on the part of the troopers."), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 
967 (1981). 
Alternatively, defendant consented to the search. As 
stated in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), consent 
to search may be found by examining these factors: Hl) the 
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner...; and 5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." Id. 
Defendant's cooperation is undisputed. There was 
never any claim that Officer Brian "exhibited force", see T. 188 
(Officer Brian testified that he did not threaten defendant in 
any way), or deceived or tricked defendant in order to induce 
defendant to consent to a search of the premises. Defendant's 
testimony at trial indicates that he knew that Officer Brian had 
no authority to search until he returned with a search warrant 
(T. 158). While Officer Brian did not "merely request" a search, 
but went on to explain that if defendant removed the 
paraphernalia from his home at that time, he would avoid charges 
relating to possession, nothing demonstrates that Officer Brian's 
explanation was incorrect, or that defendant was coerced by 
Officer Brian into giving Officer Brian the paraphernalia. 
In short, the trial court was correct in ruling as he 
First of all, THE COURT WOULD FIND that 
the evidence before the Court is that Mr. 
Brian went to the home of the defendant. Mr. 
Clark was aware that he was an officer at 
that point, that he went there alone. That 
Mr. Clark was before The Court, he is a 
person, he's not a person of young years, he 
had some experience and he's been out in the 
world. He voluntarily of his own free will 
and choice allowed the Officer to receive 
those items. 
Even assuming there may have been an 
issue in regard to that, the COURT WILL FIND 
that the objection and the motion of the 
State at this time comes to late - or of the 
defendant comes to late. We have heard 
testimony concerning all of these matters 
from not only Mr. Clark himself, but also 
from Mr. Brian and there's been no objection 
to that testimony, only to the admission of 
the items into evidence, Mr. Vanderlinden. 
(T. 201-201A). 
C. If There Had Been An Unconstitutional Search And If 
Defendant Had Preserved His Opportunity To Object 
Thereto, Any Error At Trial Would Have Been 
Harmless. 
As noted in the statement of facts, and in subpoint B 
of argument point I, there was ample evidence of defendant's 
participation in both the arrangement for distribution and in the 
distribution of cocaine to support his conviction. In light of 
this evidence, it cannot be said that the evidence of the 
paraphernalia in defendant's home was prejudicial to him; and any 
error present does not warrant reversal of his conviction. See 
State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985)(denial of motion 
to suppress, if error, was harmless because of other evidence of 
defendant's guilt). 
CONCLUSION 
Although there was evidence that defendant in fact 
distributed cocaine, there was no need for the actual 
distribution to take place in order for defendant to be convicted 
of arranging the distribution of cocaine, of which there was also 
ample evidence. 
Defendant waived his search and seizure argument, which 
is baseless because defendant gave Officer Brian the 
paraphernalia voluntarily - there was no search of his home. Had 
there been a search, defendant consented to it, and the evidence 
obtained therefrom and admitted into evidence was not prejudicial 
to defendant's case. 
The State requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction, 
DATED this I \^  day of April, 1989. 
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APPENDIX 
(in A schedule III or IV controlled substance m*»v not lie refilled 
more than six months alter the date of its original issuance of be 
refilled more than five times after the date of the prescription unless 
renewed bv the practitioner 
(in) All other controlled substances in schedule V may be refilled 
90 the preacnber's prescription directs, but they mav not be refilled 
one year after the date the prescription was issued unleaa renewed by 
the practitioner 
(ivl Any prescription for a schedule II. III. and IV substance that is 
not presented to a pharmacist for dispensing by a pharmacist, or, if 
an oral prescription, that is not obtained within ten days of the date 
the prescription was written or authorized, may not be filled or dis-
pensed 
(g) An order for a controlled substance in schedules II through V for 
use by an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from 
all requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is 
d) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates 
the quanity ordered, 
(u) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by 
the prescnber affirming his authorization of the order within 48 
hours after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record 
reflects the quantity actually administered, and 
(mi filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession 
within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken 
from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount 
taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient autho-
rized to receive it 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an at-
tempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled 
substance is considered to be a privileged communication 
History: L 1971, ch. 145,1 9; 1972. ch 21, The 1987 amendment by Chapter 161 efTec 
I I. 1977, ch. 29. I 0r. 1979, ch. 12, I 4. I WW. live January 1. 19HH ao rewrote this section as 
c h . 8 . 1 39; 1984 (2nd 8 S >, ch I&.l 9S, I9M6, to make a deUtited analyst* impracticable 
ch . 187, I 81; 1988. ch 23. | 4. 1988, ch 194, This section is set out as reconciled by the 
I 13. 1987. c h 92. I 99; 1987. ch 181. I 202. Office of Legislative Research and General 
Aaaeodaaeat Notaw. ~ The 19H7 amend Counael 
men I. by Chapter 92 corrected statutory refer 
in SubaactMMi <4rtci 
58-37-8. Prohibited acta — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally 
hi produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance. 
in) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, 
(in) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
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listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescrip-
tion, 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1) (a) with respect to 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony, 
<n) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marihuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony, or 
(in) s substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful 
(I) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or uae a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authonied by this subsec-
tion, 
(II) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by per-
sons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations, 
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present, however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so, any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense, 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance, 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency, for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Subsection 
78-3a-2(3), and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering, 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
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*viiI for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
using a false name, addrehs, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same 
<b> Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)<a><i> with respect 
to 
ti) marihuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony. 
(in a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marihuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but leas than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony, or 
(in) marihuana, if the amount is more than one ounce but less 
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
tc> Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any con 
trolled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Mb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection 
(d> Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2xb>(i>, Oi), or 
(in), including less than one ounce of marihuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXn) through 
<2KaMvii) is 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
(u) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
(in) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony 
(3) Prohibited acta C — Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful for any person 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter, 
(u) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a con-
trolled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not 
authorized by his license. 
(in) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter, 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter, or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection aa authorized 
by this chapter 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection <3>(a> shall be pun-
ished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 The proceedings are 
independent of, and not in lieu of. criminal proceedings under this chap-
ter or any other law of this state If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly 
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony 
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(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties 
(a) It IH unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person, 
(u) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of. or to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or 
procure the administration of, any controlled substance by misrepre-
sentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance, or the uae of a 
false name or address, 
(in) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter, 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any ap-
plication, report, or other document required to be kept by this chap-
ter, or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter, or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so aa to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Ma) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acta E — Penalties 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not au-
thorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section. Chapter 37a, Title 58, the Drug Paraphernalia Act, or 
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Subatancea Act, is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsec-
tion (5Mb) if the act is committed 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools, 
(n) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other struc-
ture or grounds which are, at the time of the act. being used for an 
activity sponsored by or through a school under Subsection (5XaMi); 
(in) within 1.000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsection (5XaXi) or (n), or 
(iv) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsec-
tion would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, nor is the person eligible for parole until 
187 
the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served 
<c> If the clasMfkation that would otherwise have been established 
would have been les* than a hrst decree felony but for this substttion a 
person convicted under this t>uos<ttion is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penultv prescribed for that offense 
td> It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenl) believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or *us unaware ol the individual s true age, nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act oc 
curred *as not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a) 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor 
<7> Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maxi 
mum penalty prescribed for that ofTense 
<8> ia) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction autho-
rized b> law 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been con-
victed of an ofTense under the laws of this state the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would be an ofTense within 
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-35 20, may, if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Mb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to '/* the maximum sentence imposed by 
law for the ofTense committed 
(bl <i> Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection <9Ma), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment in addition to 
the substantive ofTense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the ofTense of which the defendant was con-
victed The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time 
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event 
later than two days prior to the trial of the ofTense charged or the 
defendants entering a plea of guilty At the time of arraignment or a 
later date when granted by the court the court shall read the allega 
lion of the previous conviction to the defendant provide him or his 
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the conse-
quences of the allegation under Subsection <9><a) The allegation of 
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law 
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(n) The court following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive ofTense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Sub-
section (9Ma) und inquire as to whether the defendant admits or de-
nies the previous conviction If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall aflbrd him an opportunity to present evi-
dence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous 
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was par-
doned The evidence shall be made a matter of record Following the 
evidence the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant 
has a previous conviction which finding is final, except for a showing 
of abuse of discretion Following the findings by the court the defen-
dant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the appro-
priate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion deter-
mines 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second ofTense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Ma) and (9Mb) 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8 1001 and 76 8 1002 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evi-
dence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research, or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment 
H i s t o r y 1~ 1971. ch . 144.1 8, 1971, ch 22, 
I 1, 1977. c h 29, I 6, 1979. ch 12, I 6. I960, 
ch 146 I 1. 1986 ch 196. | 1. 1987. ch 92, 
I 100; 1987. ch 190 I 3. U 1988. c h 9 6 . 1 I 
Amendment Note* - The 1987 amend 
ment by C hapter 92 deleted "aa provided in 
Section 68 1 44" following "the consent" in the 
first sentence in Subjection <2XaHvt and mad* 
minor atvliatic change* 
The 1987 amendment by Chapter 190 re 
wrote this section which formerly read aa il 
append in the hound volume 
This MMtion » as set out in 1987 aa reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and (ten 
eral t ounael 
The 1988 amendment effective April 25 
1988 »u ball luted "convicted of violating for 
"who violates" throughout the aection, deleted 
"upon conviction" preceding "guilty" in Subeec-
Uone <l*bMi) to i lubx i in (2MbMii), and <2Md>. 
in Suhaection <2*b> tnaerted Subsection 
(2*bMi» divided former Suhaection (2MbNi) into 
preeent Suheectione <2MbMti> and (2MbXui> and 
12 MC> and designated former Subjection 
(iMbMii) aa Subsection <2Mdi designated for 
mer Subeection (2Nd aa Subsection <2*e), in 
preeant Subeection (iMbNit) inserted "if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but lees then 
100 pound*" in Subeection (3Mb) deleted 
"upon conviction" preceding "be punished" in 
the first sentence in Subsection (4Mb) deleted 
upon conviction" preceding "la guilty", and 
made various atylialtc changes) throughout the 
section 
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Conatttutionaltty. lint *HM an unconstitutional delegation of leg 
Ihe authority InrnirrU g i \ . n I In- .itiornev ifl.iti\r power Stute v Galhon, 572 P 2d 683 
gt-nrml io mid drU'tr »r n>th«*dul« tub < l i ah 19771 
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Key Number* Drug* and Narcotics *» 
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58-37-4. Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules I 
through V — Findings required — Specific sub-
stances included in schedules. 
(1> There are established five schedules of controlled substances to be 
known as schedules I, II, III, IV. and V which shall consist of substances listed 
in thi* section 
(2) Schedules I. II, III, IV, and V shall consist of the following drugs or other 
substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical 
name or brand name designated 
(a) Schedule I 
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, 
ethers, salts and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the 
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within 
the specific chemical designation 
(A) Acet>lmethadol 
<B> Allylprodine 
(C) Alphacetylmethadol 
<D> Alphameprodine 
<E> Alphamethadol 
<F» Benzethidine 
<(i» Betacetylmethadol 
<H) Betameprodine 
<I> Beta met hadol 
<J> Betaprodine 
<K) Clomtazene 
<L» Dextromoramide 
<M» Diampromide 
<N» Diethylthiambutene 
<0» Difenoxin 
(P) Dimenoxadol 
<Q> Dimepheptanol 
(R) Dimethylthiambutene 
(S> Dioxaphetyl butyrate 
<Ti Dipipanone 
(UJ Ethylmethylthiambutene 
(V> Etonitazene 
(W) Etoxendine 
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(X» Fureihidine 
<Y» Hvdroxvpethidine 
(/» Ketobernidnne 
(AAi I^evomoramide 
(BBi l^evophenacylmorphan 
i(Vi Morphendine 
(1)1)) Noracymethadol 
<EK> Norlevorphanol 
<FF> Normethadone 
<(IG> Norpipanone 
(\\\l> Phenadoxone 
411 > Phenampromide 
(JJ) Phenomorphan 
(KK) Phenopendine 
(|„L» Pintrarnide 
(MM) Proheptazine 
(NN) Proper id i ne 
<()()) Propiram 
<PPi Kacemoramide 
<QQ) Trimeperidine 
<n» Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and 
salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and 
salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Acetorphme 
(B) Acetyldihydrocodeine 
(C) Benzylmorphine 
(D> Codeine methylbromide 
(E> Codeine-N-Oxide 
<F) Cyprenorphine 
(G) Desomorphine 
(H> Dihydromorphine 
(I) Drotebanol 
(J) Ktorphine (except hydrochloride salt) 
<K> Heroin 
(L) Hydromorphinol 
(M* Methyldesorphine 
<N> Methylhydromorphine 
(()> Morphine methylbromide 
(Pi Morphine methyKulfonate 
<Q> Morphine-N-Oxide 
<R> Myrophine 
(S> Nicocodeine 
(T) Nicomorphine 
(U) Normorphine 
(V) Pholcodine 
(W) Thebacon 
(in) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains 
any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or which 
contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever 
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the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible 
within the specific chemical designation (for the purpose of this para-
graph only, the term "isomer" includes the optical, position and geo-
metric isomers» 
(Ai 4-bromo-2,5-dimetho*v-amphetamine 
(B> 2.5-dimethox\amphetamine 
i d 3.4-methylenediox\ amphetamine 
II)i 5-rnethoxy-3,4-methvlenedioxy amphetamine 
<E> 4-methoxyamphetamme . 
<F> 3.4.5-tnmethoxy amphetamine 
((ii Kufotenine 
(H> Diethyltryptamine 
(I> Dimethyltryptamme 
(J » 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine 
tK> Ibogaine 
(L» Lysergic acid diethylamide 
iM> Marihuana 
(N> Mescaline 
lOi Pevote 
(P) N-ethyl-3-pipendyl benzilate 
(Q> N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate 
<R> Psilocybin 
(S) Psilocyn 
<T) Tetrahydrocannabinols 
(U) Ethylamine analog of phencychdine 
<V> Pyrrolidine analog of phencychdine 
<W> Thiophene analog of phencychdine 
<ivi Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect 
on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts 
of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation: 
<A» Mecloqualone 
<b> Schedule II 
ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following substances whether produced directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or inde-
pendently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis 
IA i Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or 
preparation of opium or opiate, excluding apomorphine, dextror-
phan. nalbuphine, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their respec-
tive salts, but including the following: 
<A> Raw opium 
<B> Opium extracts 
i d Opium fluid extracts 
I|)i Powdered opium 
iEi Granulated opium 
<F> Tincture of opium 
<G> Codeine 
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iH> Ethylmorphine 
(h Etorphine hydrochloride 
(J) Hydrocodone 
<K) Hydromorphone 
<L> Metnpon 
<M) Morphine 
(N> Oxycodone 
iO> Oxymorphone 
cPi Thebame 
<B> Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof 
which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the sub-
stances referred to in subsection (2) (bid) (A), except that these 
substances shall not include the isoquinohne alkaloids of opium. 
<C) Opium poppy and poppy straw 
(D» Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or prepa-
ration of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or prep-
aration thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with 
any of these substances, and shall include cocaine, its isomers 
and salts of isomers, whether derived from the coca plant or 
synthetically produced, except that the substances shall not in-
clude decocainued coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which 
extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgomne. 
<E) Concentrate of poppy straw (the crude extract of poppy 
straw in either liquid, solid or powder form which contains the 
phenanthrme alkaloids of the opium poppy). 
In) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, 
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters and ethers, whenever the 
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within 
the specific chemical designation, dextrorphan excepted: 
(A) Alphaprodine 
(B> Anileridine 
(C> Bezitramide 
(D) Dihydrocodeine 
<E) Diphenoxylate 
(F) Fentanyl 
(G) Isomethadone 
(Hi l>evomethorphan 
(I) Levorphanol 
(J) Metazocme 
(K) Methadone 
(L> Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 4-
diphenyl butane 
iM> Methyl-Fentanyl 
(N> Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholino-l, 1-di-
phenylpropane-carboxyhc acid 
(()> Pethidine (meperidine) 
(P) Pethidine Intermediate-A. 4-cyano-l-methyl-4-phenylpi-
pendine 
(Q> Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-phenylpipendine-4-car-
boxylate 
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<K' Pethidine Intermediate 1 \ methvl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-
carl»o\v lie .u id 
• S> I'hen.i/iHine 
i I » Pimin«»dine 
<U» R.uemeihorphan 
iV1 Racemoiphan 
IUI» Unless tpe i i fua lh excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule anv material compound, mixture or preparation which contains 
a m quantity of the folhm inn substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous s W e i n 
iA> Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its 
optical isomers 
«B> Methamphetamine, its salLs, isomers, and salts of its iso-
mers 
i O Phenmetrazme and its salts 
<l>» Methvlphenidate 
Uv> Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, an \ material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantit> of the following substances having a depressant effect 
on the central ner \ous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts 
of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation 
(A> Amobarbital 
(B> Melhaqualone 
iU> Pentobarbital 
<D> Phencvcltdine 
<E> P h e n o c h d i n e immediate precursors l-phenyl-cyclohexyl-
amine and 1 piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitnle (PCC) 
1F1 ^M'tobarbital 
( d Schedule 111 
ill Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, anv material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers (whether 
optical, position or geometric) and salts of such isomers whenever the 
existence of such salts, isomers and salts of isomers is possible within 
the specific chemical designation 
<A» Those compounds, mixtures, or preparations in dosage 
unit form containing any stimulant substances listed in schedule 
II which compounds, mixtures, or preparations were listed on 
August 25. 1971, as excepted compounds under ^ 308 32 of Title 
21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and any other drug of the 
quantitat ive composition shown in that list for those drugs or 
which is the same except that it contains a lesser quantity of 
controlled substances 
«B) Benzphetamine 
i O Chlorphentermine 
(l)> Clortermine 
«K» Mazmdol 
(F) Phendimetrazine 
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(n> Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, anv material compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quant it \ of the following substances having a depressant effect 
on the central rnivous system 
(A) Any compound mixture or preparation containing 
amobarbit.il, secobarbital, pentobarbital, or any salt thereof and 
one or more other active medicinal ingredients which are not 
listed in any schedule 
<B> Any suppository dosage form containing amobarbital, 
secobarbital, or pentobarbital, or any salt of any of these drugs 
and approved by the Food and Drug Administration for market-
ing only as a suppository 
<C) Any substance which contains any quantity of a denvat ive 
of barbituric acid or any salt thereof 
<D> Chorhexadol 
<E) Glutethimide 
(F) Lysergic acid 
(G) Lysergic acid amide 
(H> Met hy pry Ion 
(I) Sulfondiethylmethane 
(J) Sulfonethvlmethane 
<K> Sulfonrnethane 
<L> Nalorphine 
(in) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing lim-
ited quantit ies of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any sal ts 
thereof 
(A) Not more than 1 8 grams of codeine per 100 mill i l i ters or 
not more than 90 mil l igrams per dosage unit, with an equal or 
greater quantity of an isoquinoiine alkaloid of opium 
< 131 Not more than 1 8 grams of codeine per 100 mill i l i ters or 
not more than 90 mil l igrams per dosage unit, with one or more 
active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic 
amounts 
(C) Not more than 300 mil l igrams of dihydrocodeinone per 100 
milli l iters or not more than 15 mil l igrams per dosage unit, with 
a fourfold or greater quantity of an isoquinoiine alkaloid of 
opium 
<[)> Not more than 300 mil l igrams of dihydrocodeinone per 
100 milli l iters or not more than 15 mil l igrams per dosage unit, 
with one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized 
therapeutic amounts 
(E> Not more than 1 8 grams of dihvdrocodeine per 100 millili-
ters or not more than 90 mil l igrams per dosage unit, with one or 
more active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic 
amounts 
<F> Not more than 300 mil l igrams of ethyl morphine per 100 
mill i l i ters or not more than 15 mil l igrams per dosage unit, with 
one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized thera-
peutic amounts 
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iC$) Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters 
or per 100 grams, or not more than 25 milligrams per dosage 
unit, with one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recog-
nized therapeutic amounts 
«H» Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine per 100 millili-
ters or per 100 grams with one or more active, non-narcotic in-
gredients in recognized therapeutic amounts. 
(d> Schedule IV: 
<i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing lim-
ited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts 
thereof: 
(A) Not more than 1 milligram of difenoxin and not less than 
25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit, 
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers, 
and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, 
and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designa-
tion: 
(A) Barbital 
<B> Chloral betaine 
<C> Chloral hydrate 
<D> Chlordiazepoxide 
(E) Clonazepam 
(F) Clorazepate 
(G) Diazepam 
(H) Ethchlorvynol 
(I) Ethinamate 
(J) Flurazepam 
(K) Lorazepam 
(L> Mebutamate 
(M) Methohexital 
(Nl Meprobamate 
(O) Methylphenobarbital (mephobarbital) 
(Pi Oxazepam 
(Q) Paraldehyde 
(R> Pentazocine 
<S> Petnchloral 
(T) PhenobarbiUl 
<U> Prazepam 
(ni) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, 
isomers (whether optical, position, or geometric), and salts of such 
isomers, whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers is possible: 
(A> Fenfluramine 
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on 
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers (whether 
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optical, position, or geometric), and salts of such isomers whenever 
the existence of such halts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible 
within the specific chemical designation: 
(A) Diethylpropion 
(B> Phentermine 
(C> Pemoline (including organometallic complexes and che-
lates thereof) 
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another sched-
ule, any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains 
any quantity of the following substances, including its salts: 
(A) Dextropropoxyphene (alpha < +)-4-dimethylamino-1, 2-di-
phenyl 3-methyl 2 propionoxybutane) 
(e) Schedule V: Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any 
of the following limited quantities of narcotic drugs, or salts thereof, 
which shall include one or more non-narcotic active medicinal ingredients 
in sufficient proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or prepara-
tion valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the nar-
cotic drug alone: 
(i) Not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or 
per 100 grams. 
(ii) Not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milli-
liters or per 100 grams. 
(iii) Not more than 100 milligrams of ethyl morphine per 100 milli-
liters or per 100 grams. 
(iv) Not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not lees 
than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit. 
(v) Not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or 
per 100 grams. 
(vi) Not more than 0.5 milligram of difenoxin and not leas than 25 
micrograms of atropine sulphate per dosage unit. 
History: L. 1971. ch. 145. f 4; 1977, ch. S9, coca plant or synthetically produced" in Sub-
14; 1979. ch. 12. I 3; 1961. ch. 75, | 1 aaction <2xbHtxD>. inserted « . . * — — 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- f2xbMitNM>. "Methyl FenUny!", 
merit sub*tituu*d "Hydromorphone" in Subeec- nated former Subeectiona (2w 
„tUM^. ..yunimorpnont in Subeec- nated former Subsections (2MbMuKM> to 
Uon <2HbMiMAxK> for "Hydromorphine". in- tfubMiixUl aa SubeocUooe (2MbMtiKN> t» 
anted "and shall include cocaine, its isomer* (2fchw>twvi 
tnd salts of isomers, whether derived from the 
HbXiiMV)
NOTES TO DECISION8 
ANALYSIS 
Amphetamine. 
Heroin. 
^Phetajnine. Heroin. 
* * ^ H - n i a a d e n v a t ^ o f ^ u s s ^ - . ^ 
Jjne was sufficient to b ^ . u L ^ wah,„ ^ ^ f* U V W , n U r * »• **•» « * » . jAuUor, of stimul.nt drug. u n d e r T r ™ * * P M *72 <"*«> 
« IMig Abuae Control Uw State v Madsen 
* Utah 2d 108. 498 P 2d 670 (1972? 
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